In the sicha of Shabbos Parshas Tavo, Chai Elul 5727, §טו, the Rebbe continues an explanation of Rashi’s sequence: sending away the mother bird leads to a new house and its parapet, followed by a vineyard, a field, and fine garments. Why does Rashi explicitly promise another mitzvah with the house, but not name the mitzvos of kilayim and shaatnez with the later acquisitions?

The Rebbe distinguishes the reward of acquiring property from the particular connection expressed here by “one mitzvah leads to another.” Sending away the mother bird and building a parapet resemble each other in two respects: their obligations arise when a person acts for his own benefit, and both exclude cruelty. A vineyard and garments also figure in the promised reward, but kilayim and shaatnez do not share the resemblance under discussion.

Footnote 124 supports the first point. It reports the Torah Temimah’s citation of the Ran on Chullin 140a: a bird that killed a person is exempt from being sent away because it must be brought to beis din to fulfill “ובערת הרע מקרבך,” removing evil from the community. The Ran asks why the positive and negative commandments of sending away the mother do not override the positive commandment of removing the evil.

His answer, as quoted in the footnote, turns on “מצוה המוטלת עליו,” a mitzvah incumbent upon the person. The duty to remove the evil is already incumbent upon him. The duty to send away the mother is conditional: “כי אם אינו רוצה ליקח את הבנים, פטור מלשלח האם,” if he does not wish to take the young, he is exempt from sending away the mother.

The citation thus establishes the precise feature needed for the Rebbe’s comparison with a parapet: a person’s voluntary undertaking brings a mitzvah obligation into his life. The footnote supplies that legal distinction; the body of the sicha explains how it helps connect the two mitzvos. ^{Toras Menachem 50 · §טו · footnote 124}

Return to the bird that must be brought to beis din. As the Ran’s question is presented in footnote 124, sending it away appears to have two commandments on its side, while bringing it to court has one. Why does that count not settle the case?

The answer requires an earlier question: what already obligates this person? The requirement to bring the bird to court is present independently of his wish to take the young. Sending away the mother, in the distinction quoted here, depends on that wish. Counting commandments without examining how their obligations arise misses the reason given for the exemption.

The Rebbe’s use of this answer also clarifies what “conditional” means. Sending away the mother can lead to another mitzvah and serve as the model for the parapet precisely because it is a genuine mitzvah. Its conditional character describes how a person becomes obligated; it does not make an obligation that has arisen optional.

Our gain is a clarified reading of this particular case: distinguish a duty already incumbent from a duty tied to a voluntary undertaking before comparing the commandments involved. This is an editorial explanation of the Ran passage quoted in the footnote, not a new resolution of the surrounding sugya or a general rule for deciding competing mitzvos.

Before adding a voluntary religious undertaking, identify a responsibility that already needs your attention. If someone is waiting for help you promised, set a time to follow through before filling the same time with a new project. An attractive opportunity for service deserves thought, but so does the person already relying on you.

Then examine something you have freely chosen: a purchase, a role, or a commitment at home. What care does it now require? Choosing an undertaking and accepting its responsibilities belong together. Build that care into the plan, rather than treating it as an inconvenience that appeared after the decision.

The concern for preventing cruelty gives this reflection a concrete test: who could bear the cost of my convenience? In one current undertaking, identify a foreseeable burden on another person and change something specific, such as the timing, the division of work, or a neglected safeguard. Review whether the change actually helped.

These are proposed practices in avodas Hashem drawn from the learning, not quoted instructions from the Rebbe or halachic rulings. When actual obligations conflict, ask a competent rav rather than use this comparison to decide the law.